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INTRODUCTION
The highly trained US forces operating in Mogadishu in 1993 never really
understood how the city worked. They knew that its basic infrastructure had been
destroyed and that the clan system was fundamental to its life. But they consis-
tently under-estimated the sensitivities of Somali culture, the military capabili-
ties of the factions opposing them, the effectiveness of the low-technology used
against them, the extent to which non-combatants were involved in the conflict,
and the strategic impact of their actions.1 Similar considerations would, no
doubt, have applied had Western forces been involved in fighting in Kabul in
2002. Prompted by this recurring theme I argue that we need to pay more atten-
tion to the human architecture of cities.  
It is necessary to rebalance our approach to urban operations. We consis-
tently focus on the tactical level and downplay the fact that tactics need to be
framed by a coherent and generic approach to the problems and opportunities
cities present. Yet urban operations invariably contain a strong political element.
The point is basic but deserves restating: cities are more than the sum of their
parts and tactical operations may have a strategic impact for which we are unpre-
pared. 
The tactical problems associated with the urban environment are notorious
but future operations will probably present their greatest challenge at the strate-
gic level. In this article I do not devise strategies to be adopted so much as
emphasize that urban operations require policy coherence. I make three funda-
mental points. The first is that cities are potentially strategic sites. The opera-
tional level is, as ever, critical in this matter. It importance must be acknowl-
edged, not least because it represents a wide range of problems that are inherent
in operations, but I focus here on the bigger picture. We need to specifically con-
sider strategies rather than tactics if we are to develop a coherent approach to
dealing with cities as strategic sites. The second point is that to develop a strate-
gic overview we must understand the city environment. Once again, this is a tru-
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ism. It is also one that is forgotten as often as it is emphasized, yet without it
intelligence gathering and reconstruction plans are doomed to inefficacy. We
need to know how to manage cities, either in the interests of operational effi-
ciency or because reconstruction usually begins as soon as conflict stops. The
third point is that we need to review existing assumptions about strategy and
coherence. 
Several other factors also support the need for a more comprehensive view
of urban operations. They include the strong possibility that urban threats (espe-
cially in the developing world) will not be amenable to orthodox military solu-
tions. Key cities are, for example, frequently symbolic and provide the entrance
point into intractable political or security problems. This may obscure strategic
clarity so I consider three complexity factors. The first concerns the political
environment of cities in many parts of the developing world, where commanders
may need to deal with alternative forms of political authority. The second is the
need to identify the networks and relationships underpinning functioning cities.
The third is the presence of civilians – cities are rarely empty and civilian con-
trol is a key emergent issue. Together these factors suggest that we need to ques-
tion our assumptions about what success in urban operations really means. As the
current controversy concerning the “war on terrorism” indicates, we know a lot
about the physical architecture of cities but we know much less about the human
relationships and systems underpinning them.  
CITIES AS STRATEGIC SITES
Many future operations are likely to take place on urban terrain. Rates of
urbanization, demographic trends, tighter international economic and financial
links between states, the incorporation of a policing element into peacekeeping,
security assistance, a return to counter-insurgency operations – all suggest that
the future operational environment will be characteristically urban. And histori-
cal experience indicates that the most complex and politically important urban
areas will remain cities.2 Many political objectives cannot be achieved without
controlling certain cities for various periods of time. Key cities cover military
corridors, are destination points for criminals and extremists, and are used by
global and political capital as base points in the spatial organization of produc-
tion and markets. They have long been used as sanctuaries or bases by terrorists
and insurgents, and they are densely populated. They are strategic sites. 
Military analysts naturally focus on the physical challenges of operating in
cities. The effects of densely-packed buildings on communications equipment,
the inability of tanks to deal with snipers in third-floor rooms, and the constant
need for improved situational awareness are well documented. So too is the
requirement to control civilians and distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants. But concentrating on the tactical issues runs the risk of becoming
blinkered. It neglects the fact that most conflict termination requires political
rather than military solutions. It ignores the reality that the current contests of
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globalization, cultural diversification, liberalization, and ecological change are
reflected in cities. A coherent and comprehensive politico-military policy (that is,
policy at the strategic level) demands that a greater understanding of the signifi-
cance and structure of cities should balance narrowly technical perspectives. 
Cities are not, in any case, neutral environments. They can act as catalysts
through which existing conflict is exacerbated or ameliorated because they intro-
duce “a set of characteristics – proximate ethnic neighbourhoods, territoriality,
economic interdependency, symbolism, and centrality – not present to such an
extent on wider geographic scales.”3 Cities are also political organisms. Not
only do political elites usually live in them, but also they often cover desirable
land, are links in the global production chain and targets for foreign investment,
and account for an increasing share of national income, generating 55 percent of
gross national product (GNP) even in low-income countries. Only in Africa has
urbanization not been accompanied by economic growth.
Urban operations need to be framed by wider political references as well
as by specific professional requirements. As recent operations in Afghanistan and
the Gaza Strip show, this is essential if we are to understand the socio-political
challenges that may subvert conventional Western approaches to cities. It did not
prove difficult for America’s Afghan allies in the eastern provinces of
Afghanistan to mislead the USA during OPERATION ANACONDA, and the
excessive use of military force by the Israeli Defence Force merely created new
Palestinian martyrs. In other words, the human factors that obstruct lower-level
operations – and sometimes confound strategic objectives – deserve more atten-
tion than they have received so far.
UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT
Just as it is essential to understand the physical environment of cities in
order to overcome geometric constraints, so it is necessary to assess the human
environment in order to understand, manage or exploit it.4 City life is normally
the result of a complex web of social forces, institutional settings, and interper-
sonal relationships. Such relationships are usually suspended during military
operations; scale is condensed down to the family, building, or street. But we
know little about such relationships or how they affect our political objectives.
Underestimating this task is dangerous because a simple misunderstanding can
distort our understanding of how a city works. The danger is all the greater
because most future operations will probably take place in the developing world
– and assessing trends in Southern cities is not easy for non-native analysts.
(Southern is taken here to mean the regions outside the main North American,
West European, and East Asian economic systems, which represent the North.)
As Task Force Ranger discovered in Mogadishu, it is easy to underestimate the
web of family and kin relations that may unite against foreign troops, forcing an
operation to an unexpected conclusion.
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We think of city structures and relationships in Western terms. Similarly
liberal models and statist convictions underpin our understanding of the strategic
objectives of operations. Globalization and the fact that many urban problems
present themselves in conventional terms reinforce both. When tasked with
humanitarian relief, enforcement, or (discretionary) warfighting our expedi-
tionary forces naturally look for a basic political infrastructure with which to
treat. They look for recognizable authorities, identifiable channels of communi-
cation, and an identifiable adversary. Many UN officials and forces expected
Somalis to share their values and found it difficult to adjust to the ingratitude,
seeming anarchy, and fragmented nature of Somali life. Similar problems had
confronted the French in Algiers 35 years before. Algiers was French but the
paratroopers sent to destroy the terrorist liberation movement found the silence
of the Casbah (a warren of alleys and slums in which 80,000 Algerians lived)
impenetrable without the systematic aid of torture – an option no longer open to
Western forces. They could not tell the differences between old ladies and ter-
rorists; indeed, they often had little idea of whom they were looking for.5
The battle of Algiers took place in 1957 but more recent operations, in
Grozny and Freetown as in Mogadishu, provide a salutary reminder that many
Southern cities display fluid authority systems that represent something rather
different to those of the North. We need to understand these trends, just as much
as economic regionalization, decentralization, globalization, or, indeed, urban-
ization, because they may have the potential to create a new strategic situation in
cities. 
STRATEGY AND COHERENCE
Tactical and operational skills are essential for success in the short-term
but the ultimate success of urban operations usually depends on political consid-
erations. A future scenario of simultaneous operations covering counter-insur-
gency, terrorism, humanitarian relief, peace enforcement, and warfighting (as
encapsulated by the US Marine Corps’s work on three-block operations), within
a regional hub-city, illustrates the potential task. The fact that operations may be
joint, multinational, multi-agency, and politically constrained – all this in a world
containing thermobaric weapons, weapons of mass destruction and the remnants
of al-Qaeda – is, to say the least, challenging. It also stresses that we need to
review the assumptions on which our current tactically biased expectations of
urban operations are built. This goes well beyond the issues addressed by the
USA’s Project Lincolnia.6 The current re-categorization of insurgents as terror-
ists in states ranging from Colombia and the Philippines to Russia suggests that
the need is pressing. It will be even more so if our adversaries develop innova-
tive theories of warfare, focusing on our weaknesses or templated style of oper-
ations. Four further general factors support this belief.
First, events such as those in Mogadishu, the West Bank, and Afghanistan
challenge our belief that urban operations are always amenable to orthodox doc-
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trine, suggesting that it may be necessary to adapt narrowly focused
Clausewitzian concepts such as decisive battle. Definitions of end-states and
objectives for multinational peacekeeping forces are already difficult to identify
because the defeat of an enemy by military force has been replaced by a mandate
to facilitate political settlements. The challenge may prove superficial but it is a
useful reminder that youthful and radicalized populations can count for more
than sophisticated forces or technology in some forms of urban conflict. A vari-
ant problem could present itself if Western forces become involved in non-
Western wars, perhaps because of the presence of their nationals. This too could
challenge our understanding of what constitutes an urban operation. Afghanistan
presents one type of environment but it may be contrasted with that of states in
other regions. Africa, for example, remains an overwhelmingly rural continent
but civil war in the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) in 1997 was often urban.
Roads are rare, and airfields rarer, but 62.5 percent of the population live in cities
and there were several thousand foreign nationals in Brazzaville.7 Significantly,
the resultant urban actions were not operations so much as mob warfare, with
looting, RPGs, mortar, and artillery dominating. The example is extreme but it
represents a type of scenario which Western forces may not be able to avoid. 
Second, as Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Warsaw showed during the Second
World War, many cities are not only politically symbolic but may be deliberate-
ly invested with strategic significance. In the 1968 Tet offensive, the North
Vietnamese held on to the citadel in Hue for 30 days against overwhelming odds
because of its value as a national symbol. Comparable considerations were at
work in Saigon in 1968 and 1975. We need to consider how or when that signif-
icance may be exploited, manipulated, or defended for manifestly political rea-
sons. And this applies to our cities as much as to those of our adversaries.
Third, operations in cities are political because cities are often the entrance
point to an intransigent political problem or because military operations are
understood as representing an intervention or challenge. The 1994-96 Russian
operations in Grozny are a case in point. President Dudayev declared Chechen
independence in 1991, and soon began to develop a power base in the capital city
of Grozny. In 1994, President Yeltsin ordered Russian troops into Chechnya in
an attempt to stop secession, assuming that Dudayev and his army were merely
a band of disorganized rebels and bandits. Dudayev had, however, managed to
transform the region from a semi-autonomous Russian republic into a well-
armed state. Moscow dramatically under-estimated the Chechen rebels’ determi-
nation to gain independence, with the result that the rebels continued fighting in
the countryside after Russian forces took Grozny – where fighting continues
despite further fierce battles for Grozny.8 Analogous considerations apply to the
clan warfare in Mogadishu that followed the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1989.
One of the reasons for the disintegration of the United Nation (UN)’s good inten-
tions in 1992-93 was that it became part of the struggle. The fact that US forces
slipped from providing humanitarian relief to becoming a faction in the internal
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conflict was the result of international and domestic politics. But this was
undoubtedly facilitated by the failure to pay sufficient attention to the nature and
organization of Somali political authority – which did not reflect liberal criteria.9
A fourth, linked, reason concerns the reconfiguration of political authority
evident in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa. In effect this means that the poten-
tial exists for the political importance of specific cities (and the provinces they
often represent) to increase at the expense of national governments. Parts of the
South in which the West has some interest have seen the emergence of state sys-
tems that no longer need territorial, bureaucratic, or consent based authority in
the traditional sense. Indeed, state competence has already been redefined by the
emergence of new pressures in parts of Latin America and Asia, where drug
organizations have assumed such key state functions as the provision of social
welfare and protection. In addition, the authority of many states has been reduced
in a more fundamental manner by the economic re-regulation and growing inter-
dependence of markets associated with globalization. International commercial
markets, regional bodies, and the increasing influence of international govern-
mental organizations and non-governmental organizations have further qualified
sovereignty.    
Resolving the problems associated with operations in such environments
will require more than new tactics and technology. It could, for instance, involve
developing innovative ways of projecting political power so as to achieve politi-
co-military objectives. There is thus a real need to focus on the strategic possi-
bilities relating to the integration of domestic and international assets and infra-
structure, especially where a city is a regional hub. The foundations of such an
approach already exist, having been developed during operations targeted toward
reconstruction and reconciliation. Conditions breeding alienation and terrorism
that must now be addressed in the light of al-Qaeda make the matter urgent.    
Three important complexity factors likely to affect the political environ-
ment of cities are addressed here. They are used as an initial means of rebalanc-
ing the resultant concerns, for if the balance is not adjusted there is a danger of
urban operations presenting us with problems we have not recognized, let alone
considered. The first issue concerns the reconfiguration of political authority.
The second, that of the systems underpinning cities, has so far received little
attention from military commentators, while the last, the control of civilians, is a
consistent tactical and doctrinal motif but is rarely considered strategically nowa-
days. Post-hostilities operations are not covered here but they also represent a
significant theme in urban operations because reconstruction programs accom-
pany most contemporary conflicts. Urban operations will probably be no differ-
ent; indeed, infrastructure issues may come to the fore as a means for achieving
overall strategic aims.10
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POLITICAL AUTHORITY
One reason why we are reluctant to consider urban operations from a
strategic point may be because many areas of life in which centralization is taken
for granted in the West are outside the scope or reach of Southern regimes.
Nation-wide power structures may be non-existent and the control of key cities
may mean less than we wish.11 It is easier to deal with a Robert Mugabe than a
Mohammed Aidid, and it is often politically inappropriate to deal with the fac-
tional leaders, terrorists, or cartel chiefs entrenched in regional cities as if they
possessed authority. Similarly, in many parts of the world it is illiberal groups
such as Hamas, with which we do not wish to treat, that provide social services,
medical assistance, and temporary housing. 
Another reason is because we have difficulty in dealing with alternative
forms of authority. A common obstacle to success in contemporary operations,
especially those with expanded missions, has been the failure to determine who is
in charge in a city. Although formal authority structures are rarely pivotal in deter-
mining the effectiveness of operations, Western states and intergovernmental
organizations such as the UN need identifiable political authorities with which to
work. The need is unlikely to lessen because it is linked to the legitimization
required by international operations (typically provided by UN mandates or, more
controversially, self-mandated in the case of NATO in Kosovo). It also results
from the awareness that recognition by the military can (as happened in Somalia
and Bosnia) confer an inappropriate legitimacy. It may also link into wider trends
in the nature of political authority as reflected in debates over internationalization,
localization, and non-state actors. Violence in East Timor and economic disaster
in Indonesia have, for instance, been directly linked to the support of Western
banks and governments for a regime that tolerated a weak rule of law.
There are many possible reconfigurations of political authority but, if the
changes evident since the end of the Cold War are fundamental, future urban
operations could take place in an environment in which cities represent, or are
composed of, multiple competing institutions and overlapping jurisdictions.
What this might mean can be deduced from concepts such as neomedievalism
and shadow states. If, for example, authority (primarily in the South) is under-
stood in terms of neomedievalism, then zones of political authority, with over-
lapping boundaries and, significantly, no universal centre of competence, can be
identified. This could mean that certain cities become enforcement agents or exe-
cution places for decisions made elsewhere in the international system. Success
in the ensuing operations could prove illusive, not least because of the difficul-
ties associated with creating effective multinational operations in such circum-
stances.
An alternative interpretation to neomedievalism in Southern states is what
William Reno calls shadow states. Shadow states present alternative forms of
structure and power (and profit), in which regimes draw authority from their abil-
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ity to control markets and resources, rather than territory or coercive agents.12
The resultant development of associations and activities not directly under state
control are nothing new but they undoubtedly represent a “highly subversive
space ... where new structures and norms may take hold to challenge the existing
state order.”13
It might be argued that the erosion of the post-colonial and post-Cold-War
state and a return to the enclave economies and private armies of earlier years
would be confined to rural regions in sub-Saharan Africa. It is possible that such
trends are peripheral to future urban operations because the regimes running
shadow states (and often employing Western private military companies) are
most unlikely to engage with Western military forces. Similarly, their relevance
might be debated on the grounds that we shall not choose to become embroiled
in any African state, though this would be in practice to rule out the possibility
of operations in more than 50 fragile states. It would be also to ignore
Washington’s concern for possible al-Qaeda links in Somalia.14 Irrespective of
such objections, the analytical value of shadow states is that they present a dra-
matically different configuration of political authority that will be made manifest
in the South and that Western politicians and military forces will find difficulty
in confronting successfully. 
Globalization will exacerbate such difficulties for, as Reno argues, the ties
between foreign firms and rulers in states where politicians and big men use pri-
vate networks to enforce their demands and extend their powers of patronage
have played a dominant part in many conflicts. Reno does not address conflict as
such but his argument that corruption is fundamental to states such as Sierra
Leone, that it is disconnected from individual morality and the failure of state
institutions, is of general relevance because it is indicative of the entrenched
nature of problems commonly associated with operations in fragile states. Such
an interpretation is even more relevant when combined with other analyses, such
as the political instrumentalization of disorder in contemporary Africa identified
by Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz.15 It also links into the fact that con-
flict invariably represents a business opportunity, especially in cities such as
Freetown or Grozny, or a chance to settle old scores.16 And it suggests that oper-
ations in such environments will once again leave Western forces asking: who is
in charge? It will be an even more difficult question to answer if a regime or
city’s elite no longer needs formal state agencies, instead exploiting their depend-
ency on the foreign firms, mercenaries, creditors, and aid organizations that con-
tribute the resources sustaining them. 
Strategic incoherence is the probable result of operations in such states.
The role of state-centric diplomacy will be limited in these circumstances, and
strategy will have to accommodate centrifugal forces. The fact that it failed to do
so in Somalia – and runs similar risks in Afghanistan – suggests that it may be
necessary to redefine our expectations of the type of conflict associated with
such environments. 
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Strong Trends
The characteristics of most contemporary operations suggest this is the
case. Indeed, the trend for conflicts to be intrastate (and to transmute into pro-
longed crises) not only implies a changing location of political violence in rela-
tion to the nation-state, but, through its relative informality, suggests that the
organizational forms and borders of conflict are also changing. Thus future urban
operations may involve many actors, ranging from the warlords, militia, child
soldiers, and local inhabitants of existing states, to those representing the more
futuristic Netwar. 
The identification of warlords or local strongmen able to control an area
and exploit its resources (while at same time keeping both central and foreign
authorities at bay and successfully forging international links) would appear rel-
atively straightforward if it were not for the problems made explicit by the deba-
cle of Somalia. The role of militia also seems clear-cut though various types of
militia played an integral part – sometimes with a strategic impact – in urban
operations in Mogadishu and Chechnya. The Soviet Army’s experience against
the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s is relevant too, as is the more recent
reliance of the US on the militia belonging to various Afghan warlords. Nor
should we forget that the Taliban controlled much of Afghanistan until recently,
and defined the rules for dialogue between India and the hijackers of an Indian
Airlines jet at Kandahar airport in January 2000. 
The systematized use of child soldiers could present greater (initial) prob-
lems for Western forces in a combat environment.17 Their use in all recent wars
in sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, has been made possible by the availability of
cheap, light, and easy to use automatic weapons. Many commanders also prefer
children because they are malleable, they lack a sense of proportion, and can be
persuaded to carry out acts of great violence. The interest of the Western media
in such an emotive topic will require the provision of significant strategic guid-
ance for the development of appropriate rules of engagement. The same consid-
erations apply to combat involvement by the indigenous population on the lines
of that seen in Mogadishu. 
The deliberate use of children and local inhabitants in combat seems unso-
phisticated when contrasted with the hierarchical systems typical of the interna-
tional military but, as Somalia showed, it should not be under-estimated. The
potential threat from the sophisticated actors associated with transnational net-
works is more obvious. This is because it is less visible and because political
power can migrate to those non-state actors able to organize into sprawling orga-
nizational networks, with lateral forms of control, authority, and communication,
more readily than to traditional state actors. The conventional application of mil-
itary force may be of peripheral value in such a scenario.
“Netwar” refers to the modes of conflict and crime emerging as a result. It
is relevant to future urban operations – especially those involving digitized
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forces – because it is notoriously difficult to fight and because it involves meas-
ures short of traditional war, in which the protagonist’s use of network forms of
organization and related doctrines, strategies, and technologies are “attuned to
the information age.”18 It may introduce new features which a simple reliance
on established counter-insurgency (COIN) principles, for instance, cannot
address. Not only may past lessons turn out to be less easily transferable to this
new situation than is often assumed, but the assumptions on which they are based
may themselves prove dangerous simply because many forms of networks
appear familiar. And in Netwar, as in COIN, tactical focus is unlikely to be suf-
ficient because Netwar will be able to cut across standard boundaries, jurisdic-
tions, and conventional distinctions between state and society, public and private,
war and crime, civilian and military. If, as seems likely, it is necessary to draw
on the same organizational designs and principles (on the principle that it takes
a network to fight a network) then strategic coherence to urban operations will
be critical.  
SYSTEMIC EFFECTS
The problems associated with understanding the physical infrastructure of
cities as a coherent whole are well-known19 but identifying and quantifying the
systems or networks underpinning them is more difficult. Such systems represent
the second complexity factor. 
The set of systems cities represent usually consists of an organizational
infrastructure, often involving security forces, transport, and utilities, overlaid on
social and cultural structures reflecting sociocultural patterns that may be indige-
nous or based on those in other regions. They are likely to be bureaucratic or to
consist of organizations made up of groups and individuals, existing for specific
purposes, and employing relatively structured types of activity with an identifi-
able boundary. But actors pursuing their own incentives also drive systems, and
the complexity of cities results from interaction between the various systems.20
In addition, the inhabitants concerned may base their understanding of their city
on the geographical area in which they live, the public and political organizations
of their state, province, or country, or the historical aspirations of their commu-
nity, often understood in terms of territory.21 The fluid human networks under-
pinning the myriad systems in a big city are much more difficult to identify than
the physical or economic networks. 
Ultimately the need to understand this depends on the type of operation
concerned; it may be irrelevant in attritional or retributive actions. But the
expanded scope of most recent operations, their humanitarian emphasis, multi-
national components, the media intensity, and the ambiguity of much intergov-
ernmental strategic direction suggests that cities’ systems are likely to present
strategic and tactical impediments, especially when combat takes place simulta-
neously with enforcement and relief. The need to understand the systems
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involved, especially those representing non-Western values and norms, is likely
to complicate strategic considerations, either directly or in terms of discontinu-
ities, unanticipated effects, or uncertainty. Future urban combat could even drive
systemic relationships through an escalatory process. This will not necessarily be
a linear process but it could represent more than a combination of factors react-
ing in a predictable chain. Escalation could mean that the conventional cycle of
combat, post-hostilities operations, and reconstruction might not result in a
desired (or previously existing) status quo. War has often acted as a social and
political accelerator in the past, so urban operations may prompt, destroy, or
cause systemic change. Urban operations may themselves have systemic and
strategic effects.  
CONTROLLING CIVILIANS
The third major complexity factor identified here is that associated with the
presence of the civilians constituting the systems. Even if a city such as
Shanghai, with its associated population of 125 million in 2,383 square miles,22
presents an extreme and improbable scenario, recent operations emphasize that
cities are never empty, civilian casualties are an emotive issue, strategic evacua-
tion policies have not been seriously considered for many years, and the presence
of non-combatants complicates existing military-civil distinctions. This proved
to be the case even in Grozny during Christmas 1999. Leaflets dropped by
Russian planes on 5 December warned that anyone remaining in the city after 11
December would be viewed as “terrorists and bandits” and would be destroyed.
The main Russian commander in Grozny, General Viktor Kazantsev insisted that
only women, children, and men over the age of 60 would be regarded as
refugees, everyone else was to be detained. Yet an estimated 10,000 to 40,000
civilians remained in the city as it was destroyed, either unable or unwilling to
escape the bombardment. Separating them from combatants proved extremely
difficult.23
Controlling civilians is a problem at every level of operations but it has
received remarkably little attention in terms of strategy. There appears to be no
generic policy guidance apart from references to liberal norms yet it is likely to
be a consistent theme across operations for the foreseeable future. Russian forces
were not constrained in their dealings with civilians, nor were they required to
distinguish between humanitarian, enforcement, and combat operations. But the
lessons of Chechnya should not be dismissed as irrelevant to the West because it
is arguable that they apply to “any modern, mechanized force fighting a deter-
mined enemy in a city.”24 Indeed, Chechnya represents a situation that an
American or European expeditionary force could face if threats to an important
ally or trade route necessitated some form of power projection: crime is rampant,
law non-existent, and terrorism and religious extremism have made dramatic
inroads.25
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The control of civilians is likely to be a significant, potentially strategic
factor in any urban operation, especially at the relief and enforcement end of the
operational spectrum, and the problems associated with achieving it should not
be underestimated. Sub-lethal weapons (especially those associated with the
electronic stimulation of nerves) may eventually prove useful but the technology
is currently immature, the scale of application is likely to be small, and its use
will be controversial. The policing of big cities such as Karachi or Mumbai is
already difficult even for forces familiar with their nuances. The policing of
smaller cities (Mitrovica for instance) by military, paramilitary, or police forces
in peace support operations is sometimes equally so.26 Partly because of this
urban operations usually require the military to confront or manage criminal
gangs, especially when ordinary crime appears out of control and there is no sup-
porting judicial system. A common problem in Mogadishu, for example, centred
on what should be done with a gunman or rioter once he was apprehended. But
relying on recent experience for guidance in such operations may be misleading
because, although urban policing missions are often considered to be low risk,27
scale will make a difference. Although almost 65 percent of the world’s urban
residents live in small and medium-size cities, the scale of important coastal
cities such as Cairo, Calcutta, Lagos, and Los Angeles exemplifies the potential
problem. And the resources needed to conduct operations are always very high
in relation to the geographical size of an area, even when fighting between dis-
tinct armed forces, as in Grozny, is unlikely. Furthermore, different types of cities
in different regions may require different forms of management; boom cities
(such as Seoul) are different to reservoir cities (Johannesburg) where men are
held, while dispersed cities or conurbations on the scale of Washington, DC are
different again.28
Yet it may be easy to over-estimate some of the problems associated with
the presence of civilians simply because the principle of military necessity is
likely to dominate wherever the situation is sufficiently serious for robust
enforcement or warfighting. Much of our existing doctrine concerning civilian
control is based on peacekeeping and peace enforcement, but current practice is
not necessarily a guide to the realities of war as may be illustrated by reference
to civil affairs, currently regarded as a critical support element in the civil-mili-
tary interface. It is probable that civil affairs and its derivatives will revert to
more traditional modes of expression29 during warfighting. The civil affairs
organization developed during World War II, for instance, may have fulfilled
public health and feeding duties but it acted primarily as a post-conflict activity
in support of military-related objectives. These included relieving combat troops
of the requirement to provide the civil administration under the law of war. Civil
affairs did have a duty to assist in the restoration of “normal” conditions among
civilians as soon as possible, but such objectives were offset by the need to meet
the requirements of military necessity. Civil affairs was required to ensure that
the economic resources of occupied or liberated territory were made available to
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the occupying forces as well. Civil affairs was always an instrument of military
authority rather than humanitarian relief, and it existed (as General Eisenhower
noted), “to keep the civil population from under the feet of the Army.”30
Despite the invaluable experience provided by World War II, the problems
associated with the effective, let alone efficient, management of civilians in the
light of contemporary Western values remain unresolved. The British experience
in Northern Ireland holds some general lessons for low level urban operations, as
does that of the Israelis in Jerusalem, but the fact that our involvement in conflict
is now prompted by choice, rather than necessity, and is shaped by liberal norms
and fears, suggests that political guidance will remain critical. The very fact that
much seems to depend on the region in which conflict takes place further empha-
sizes that political factors are paramount. This can be seen from two contrasting
examples. The presence of civilians during the liberation of Western European
cities in 1944-45 was considered a tactical or operational problem, with civilians
merely imposing some restrictions on movement and weapons choice. But it is
evident that the existence of civilians during the liberation of the Low Countries,
for instance, imposed more limitations on the occupying armies than it did in
Caen. Take the case of the battle for the city of Groningen in the Netherlands in
April 1945. Military options were dictated by the fact that the eastern flank of
Groningen was effectively unassailable because the existence of a large hospital
meant the use of heavy artillery was unacceptable.31 In contrast, UN forces in
Somalia were unrepentant that civilians close to the scene of an attack were
regarded (and treated) as combatants, whether armed or not: “In an ambush there
are no sidelines for spectators.”32 The grand strategy was clear in 1945; every-
thing followed from the imperative of unconditional surrender. But we are no
longer involved in a total war and future conflicts are likely to prove more
nuanced.
Different cultures place different values on human life but both World War
II and more recent conflicts in Somalia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan suggest that
the presence of civilians will intensify political and operational problems for the
multi-national forces so characteristic of contemporary operations. The UN mil-
itary operation in Somalia, for instance, was weakened by disputes within the
27,000-strong 28-nation force, with many nations resenting US dominance and
questioning the wisdom of demonizing General Aidid. Many commanders cut
informal deals with local militia to protect their forces from snipers, while coop-
eration between troops of different nationalities was often minimal and when dis-
putes occurred they became full-blown diplomatic incidents. This is not to sug-
gest that such a response is directly linked to the presence of civilians so much
as to emphasize that the presence of civilians cannot be considered in isolation
from political issues; tactics are not necessarily separate from the other opera-
tional levels.33 Urban operations must engage with this fact.
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NEW WAYS OF THINKING
In order to reconsider operations in cities we need to question our assump-
tions about the ways in which cities work in both peace and war. The problems
currently associated with urban operations may be a natural consequence of the
logic of our present approach so we may be able to deal with the problems only
by restructuring the logic. Tactics are critical but ignoring strategic considerations
could end in entrapment, preventing a full examination of the character of the
commitment and the authority structures to be coerced. The policy processes
associated with the development of urban operations as a unique type of opera-
tion must be made responsive to the risks of entrapment, for entrapment may itself
become the objective of an adversary if he is able to influence such processes.
Events may prompt the necessary changes. The British Strategic Defence
Review (SDR), for example, has re-examined the nature of asymmetric threats in
the light of the suicide hijackings of 11 September 2001.34 This is necessary
because although the 1998 SDR recognized the existence of potential asymmet-
ric threats it treated them as one of a range of tactics a potential adversary might
use, rather than as a strategic risk with the potential for strategic change. Urban
operations could experience a similar adjustment – but it is better if intellectual
change occurs in advance of catastrophic events. One way in which the issue can
be addressed is through ideas and scenarios, such as those suggested by the con-
cept of escalation, with its connotations of complexity and uncertainty.35 The
case for escalation- (as opposed to chaos- or complexity-) theory needs further
development but its initial value is that it is concerned with strategic planning.
That the metaphor of escalation does not necessarily include qualitative change
is of less importance than the fact that it provides a tool for considering the
growth potential of known types of operations. These range from the conven-
tional to the unprecedented or bizarre, and embrace level of complexity, disloca-
tion, longevity, or scale. It provides a framework for thinking about the dynam-
ics of strategic policies. 
Escalation also provides a warning that the very phrase “urban operations”
implies a degree of control that rarely exists, and that routine methods of plan-
ning must be open to new ways of thinking. This is important because the way
we think and the way we act are tightly linked, and organizational problems often
result from our thinking. Thus achieving new ways of thinking about urban oper-
ations will require more than a simple identification of the military options avail-
able in cities, not least because globalization and urbanization processes interact
to create new sources of uncertainty, structural tension, and loyalty. Whether or
not the structural dominance of the state as the prime level of political organiza-
tion will continue is debatable but, for the moment at least, globalization and
urbanization draw attention to significant changes in the role of certain cities. 
At the international level globalization emphasizes the potential for impor-
tant cities and their infrastructure to become critical security issues. The
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metaphor of globalization, describing the connected nature of such factors as the
transmission backbone networks underpinning telecommunications and financial
dealings, emphasizes that a change in one of the elements underpinning a func-
tionally important city could set in train a cascade of reflexive changes in others.
An effect of operations in a hub- or world city could extend the notion of an
enemy well beyond the parties immediately involved, perhaps attracting a new
set of factors exploiting historical enmities. This could require a reconceptual-
ization of urban operations to include economic targeting and information oper-
ations as dominant forms of warfighting, together with more subtle forms of
exploitation, denial, or punishment. 
The affects of internationalization have tended to shape our understanding
of the strategic environment but the increasing rate of urbanization suggests that
the emphasis should be re-balanced in the latter’s favor. It is probable that the
world, with its scarce resources and burgeoning population, is now entering a
characteristically urban era in which many military operations will take place in
cities; new sources of endemic low-level conflict are already evident in the
densely populated cities of the South. Such trends have multiple strategic and
tactical implications. At the domestic level, for example, the culture and behav-
ior of an urban society tends to be different to that of a rural society, while gov-
ernments usually respond differently to threats against a city than to those against
more rural areas. Cities also attract the disaffected, are vulnerable to asymmetric
action, and, in the South at least, are increasingly inhabited by large, youthful,
and highly motivated populations. It is the mix of such factors, interacting with
political contingencies, technological developments, and trends such as decen-
tralization and international intervention by multinational forces, that leads to
shifts in the strategic environment.   
AN URBAN ERA
At the beginning of the twenty-first century half of the world’s population
lives in areas classified as urban. This has significant political and military impli-
cations, not least because Asia and Africa are only just beginning their urban
transition. The institutions and politics that served the relatively dispersed and
stable rural populations of the twentieth century do not necessarily transfer well
to cities and new tensions and conflicts are a frequent result. Tensions are further
accentuated by increasing inequalities between the economic North and South.
Recent operations in Grozny, Mostar, and Ramallah are not anomalous.
Precisely what operations will look like in, say, 2010 is impossible to pre-
dict with any certainty. The only thing that can be said with assurance about the
future is that it will differ from the present. Any list of the most significant fac-
tors affecting operations in the coming decades is to some extent arbitrary. Such
a list might, however, include the following possibilities, all of which relate to
urbanization: demographic pressures, migration, and a shift in age compositions
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will be accompanied by growing threats to water security and by other “new
security” issues often representing specifically urban vulnerabilities.  
It would be rash to predict which of these factors will be high on the poli-
cy agenda in 2010 but one compelling factor is clear: controlling key cities usu-
ally requires enforcement operations or warfighting. This is unlikely to change.
Neither is the fact that cities, especially when functioning in the midst of exist-
ing nationalistic or ethnic conflict, can themselves influence the processes and
outcomes of both specific and broader conflicts. For cities introduce a set of
characteristics and factors which are themselves capable of strategic effect. A
change in one of the elements underpinning a functionally important city could
set in train a cascade of reflexive changes in others; operations in a hub- or world
city could thus extend the notion of an enemy well beyond the parties immedi-
ately involved.  
Global trends imply that urban operations are likely to prove as character-
istic of the 2010s as peacekeeping has been of the 1990s. Self-interest suggests
we should therefore concern ourselves with developing an over-view of the place
of urban terrain in military operations. We should pay more attention to devel-
oping strategies for military operations in cities, as opposed to tactics for urban
terrain generally, because such operations can easily generate unforeseen conse-
quences and contradictions that could endanger our own ideological interests. 
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